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1Abstract
This article deals with the estimation of a time-varying coe¢ cients equation
with endogenous regressors. A non-parametric approach is proposed, combining
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with the smoothing splines littera-
ture as in Hodrick and Prescott (1981).
This new method is used to analyze the evolution of a forward-looking Tay-
lor rule for the Federal Reserve (FED) from 1960 until 2006. It suggests that
monetary policy accomodated in￿ation during the 60s and the 70s whereas the
chairmanship of P.Volcker was a turning point toward a more agressive stance
on in￿ation. In addition, monetary policy became more and more countercycli-
cal.
JEL classi￿cation: E5; C14; C32
Keywords: Monetary policy rules; Generalized Method of Moments; Time-
varying coe¢ cients; Smoothing splines
RØsumØ
Ce papier traite de l￿ estimation d￿ une Øquation linØaire ￿ coe¢ cients vari-
ables dans le temps et dont les erreurs sont corrØlØes aux variables explicatives.
On dØveloppe une mØthode d￿ estimation non paramØtrique qui emprunte ￿ la
fois ￿ la MØthode des Moments GØnØralisØe (MMG) et ￿ celle des "smoothing
splines" type Hodrick-Prescott (1981).
Dans la lignØe des travaux de Taylor (1993), on applique cette mØthodologie
￿ l￿ Øtude de l￿ Øvolution d￿ une rŁgle de politique monØtaire forward-looking pour
la FED. Au niveau des rØsultats, la rØponse de long terme du taux d￿ intØrŒt ￿
l￿ in￿ation est croissante au cours de la pØriode. En particulier, on montre que
la politique monØtaire est accommodante jusqu￿ ￿ la ￿n des annØes 1970. La
rØponse ￿ l￿ Øcart de production cro￿t elle aussi continuement, ce qui constitue
un rØsultat nouveau.
Codes JEL : E5; C14; C32
Mots ClØs : RŁgle de politique monØtaire; MØthode des moments gØnØralisØs;
Equation ￿ coe¢ cients alØatoires; Smoothing splines
2Non-technical summary
Taylor rules have now become very popular to describe the decision making
of central bankers. They do not only succeed in terms of econometric estimation
but they are also relevant for a theoretical use, for instance to ensure the unique-
ness of the equilibrium in DSGE models. However, monetary policy is one of
the numerous ￿elds subject to variations across time. Central bankers change
as well as the understanding of the economy or even the aims of monetary pol-
icy. The policy implications of such time variations are important. There is a
debate among economists to know whether the poor economic performance in
the United States during the 70s was just the result of adverse shocks or if it
was policy related, debate known as bad luck vs bad policy.
Many authors have studied the possible time variation in Taylor rules. Clar-
ida, Gali and Gertler (2000) estimate monetary policy rules on subperiods they
assume to be homogenous. Kim and Nelson (2006) go further, allowing for con-
tinuous changes in the coe¢ cients of the rule. Our stand is to estimate such
time-varying coe¢ cients. To do so, I try to impose as few priors as possible.
Especially, I do not have any prior, neither on the rule at the begining of our
sample nor on the form of the evolution. Especially, we do not impose the time
variation to be a structural break.
The results con￿rm that monetary policy accomodated in￿ ation during the
60s and the 70s and that the appointment of P.Volcker was a turning point
toward a more aggressive stance on in￿ ation. The pro￿le of the long term
response of the interest rate to the in￿ ation is very close to a structural break.
At the same time, the rule became more and more countercyclical but in a
continuous way.
3RØsumØ non technique
L￿ utilisation de rŁgles de Taylor s￿ est gØnØralisØe dans l￿ analyse de la poli-
tique monØtaire. Elles sont utiles non seulement pour l￿ estimation de rŁgles de
politique monØtaire mais jouent aussi un r￿le thØorique central, notamment pour
assurer la dØtermination locale de l￿ Øquilibre dans les modŁles DSGE. Cepen-
dant, la politique monØtaire est sujette ￿ des variations importantes au cours
du temps. Les banquiers centraux se succŁdent, la connaissance du fonction-
nement de l￿ Øconomie s￿ amØliore et les objectifs assignØs ￿ la politique monØ-
taire changent. Ces Øvolutions ont des consØquences importantes sur la politique
Øconomique. Ainsi, les Øconomistes cherchent ￿ savoir si la politique monØtaire a
jouØ un r￿le dans les performances Øconomiques dØcevantes des annØes soixante-
dix aux Etats-Unis ou si elles Øtaient entiŁrement liØes ￿ des chocs adverses.
Plusieurs auteurs ont ØtudiØ l￿ Øvolution de la politique monØtaire. Clarida,
Gali et Gertler (2000) estiment des rŁgles de politique monØtaire sur des sous
pØriodes a priori homogŁnes. Kim et Nelson (2006) vont plus loin en postulant
une Øvolution continue des coe¢ cients de la rŁgle. Nous poursuivons dans cette
direction en essayant d￿ imposer le moins d￿ a priori possibles. En particulier,
nous n￿ imposons pas la forme d￿ Øvolution des coe¢ cients ou leur valeur en dØbut
d￿ Øchantillon.
Les rØsultats con￿rment le caractŁre accommodant de la politique monØtaire
pendant les annØes soixante et soixante-dix ainsi que le tournant provoquØ par la
nomination de P. Volcker. En particulier, l￿ Øvolution de la rØponse de long terme
du taux d￿ intØrŒt ￿ l￿ in￿ ation est trŁs proche d￿ une rupture structurelle. Dans le
mŒme temps, la politique monØtaire est devenue de plus en plus contracyclique
mais de maniŁre continue.
41 Introduction
This paper deals with the estimation of a time-varying coe¢ cients equation. In
what follows, these coe¢ cients are assumed to follow a random walk, allowing
for permanent changes. Moreover, I suppose that the error term is correlated
to the explanatory variables, which forbids the use of the Kalman ￿lter. This
endogeneity problem arises because of the presence of expected values in the
regressors: under the rational expectations hypothesis, these expectations are
replaced with future variables.
I use this procedure to assess the way the FED has set its interest rate
over the past 40 years. Simple monetary policy rules depending on expected
in￿ ation and output gap with some degree of interest rate smoothing ￿t the
data quite well as documented in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) for instance.
Nevertheless, when the time period is too long, it is di¢ cult to rely on a constant
rule. Changes may occur because of a better economic knowledge or changes
in the doctrine or even structural changes in the economy. For instance, Romer
and Romer (2002) see changes in the understanding of the functioning of the
economy as the main reason for the changes in the way monetary policy was
conducted. Many authors studied the evolution in the conduct of monetary
policy, to assess whether the poor economic performance in the United States
during the 70s was the result of bad luck or bad policies. Sims and Zha (2006)
or Primiceri (2005) ￿nd that the changes in the volatility of the shocks were
the main source of time variation. Cogley and Sargent (2005) account for both
sources of time variation.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) use the GMM framework to estimate mon-
etary policy rules on subperiods they assume to be homogenous. They ￿nd that
monetary policy accommodated in￿ ation in the 60s and the 70s and a long term
response of the interest rate to future in￿ ation close to two under P.Volcker or
A.Greenspan. The choice of the break date may seem a bit arbitrary and there
is a risk to carry out an estimation on too short time periods.
Kim and Nelson (2006) estimate monetary rules with a two-step procedure
close to the two stages least squares (2SLS) allowing for the use of the Kalman
￿lter. Their approach, described in appendix A.2, allows for heteroskedasticity
of the monetary policy shock and thus time periods during which discretion
increased. However, their results may be questionned on several grounds: they
only display results of ￿ltered estimates instead of smoothed estimates3; initial
conditions are estimated with the 2SLS on 40 quarters. The impact of initial
conditions is decreasing when time goes on but, since their sample begins in
1970, their results, at least until 1980, are sensitive to this fragile prior. They
3The likehood is computed from the prediction error decomposition based on the forward
step of the Kalman ￿lter. Once one has the parameters that maximize the likehood, it is easy
to compute ￿ltered estimates but also smoothed estimates based on the backward recursion
of the Kalman ￿lter. Smoothed estimates are hence based on all the information available.
5account for this uncertainty in the initial variance of the state vector but, since
they use ￿ltered estimates, the ￿rst years depend strongly on this prior whereas
the use of smoothed estimates would have partly solved this issue. One can
notice that there is another solution to estimate initial conditions: the use of
generalized least squares as in Lemoine and Pelgrin (2003). Finally, they choose
a particular form of correlation between the regressors and the error term and a
particular form of heteroskedasticity of the error term, namely a GARCH(1,1).
The use of real-time forecasts, as Boivin (2006), is another way to get round
the endogeneity problem. The model is then a standard state-space problem.
Boivin (2006) uses real-time forecasts provided by the Greenbook. This real-
time approach raises some questions. The unemployment gap is negative on the
whole part of the sample4. As the state vector follows a random walk, Boivin
(2006) chooses some particular initial conditions, a long term response of the
interest rate to in￿ ation equal to 2 and a long term response of the interest rate
to the unemployment gap of 2.5 in 1970. Finally, the results seem to depend on
how heteroskedasticity is handled.
I suggest a new estimation strategy which aims at minimizing the empirical
counterpart of moment conditions subject to the coe¢ cients evolution. My
approach belongs to the smoothing splines litterature in line with the seminal
paper by Hodrick and Prescott (1981). I get a whole class of estimates depending
on the weight put on the empirical couterpart of the moment conditions and on
the amount of time variation allowed in the coe¢ cients. It is then possible to
choose the estimate that minimizes the distance between the true coe¢ cients and
the estimated ones and which is locally optimal too. My method makes minimal
assumptions on initial conditions or on the error terms. The results show the
accommodative pattern during the 60s and the 70s and the turning point at
the end of the 70s when P.Volcker was appointed chairman of the Board. As
opposed to Kim and Nelson (2006), the results suggest a countercyclical feature
increasing over the sample.
Section 2 describes the approach, section 3 computes the estimates and de-
rives the optimality conditions and section 4 illustrates the implementation of
this methodology on the FED￿ s behaviour between 1960 and 2006.
4Orphanides (2004) notices that the output gap is below zero on the most part of the period,
which means that forecasters had always anticipated an economy below its potential. Boivin
(2006) uses rather the unemployment gap de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the natural rate of
unemployment and the expected unemployment rate, setting the natural rate of unemployment
equal to the historical average of unemployment in the past. This choice gives data similar to
Orphanides (2004). One can notice that such data does not verify the rationnal expectations
hypothesis.
62 Econometric strategy
2.1 Equation of interest and estimation strategy
This paper focuses on estimating a forward-looking Taylor rule:
it = a0;t + a￿;tEt￿1 (￿t+h) + ay;tEt￿1 (yt+l) + ai;tit￿1 + !t (1)
where it, ￿t, yt and !t stand for the Federal Funds Rate, the in￿ ation at an
annual rate, the output gap and a monetary policy shock. The vector of coe¢ -
cients ￿t = (a0;t;a￿;t;ay;t;ai;t)
0 follows a random walk:
￿
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ut
ut ￿ N (0;Qu)
From the notations, (1) contains expectations Et￿1 (:) = E (:jIt￿1) condi-
tionnal on all the information set available at the beginning of date t which
consists of the interest rate, the output gap, the in￿ ation, and other variables
until t￿1. In other words, when the central bank takes its decision at the begin-
ning of the quarter, all the current variables are unknown. Under the rational
expectations hypothesis, (1) can be expressed as:
it = a0;t + a￿;t￿t+h + ay;tyt+l + ai;tit￿1 + vt (2)
with vt = ￿a￿;t (￿t+h ￿ Et￿1 (￿t+h))￿ay;t (yt+l ￿ Et￿1 (yt+l))+!t. The error
term vt in (2) is thus correlated to explanatory variables ￿t+h and yt+l for two
possible reasons: ￿rst, forecast errors ￿t+h ￿Et￿1 (￿t+h) and yt+l ￿Et￿1 (yt+l)
are correlated with ￿t+h and yt+l ; second, if the monetary policy shock !t
a⁄ects the real economy between t and t + h=t + l , it is correlated with ￿t+h
and yt+l too.
In the following, xt = it is the endogenous variable, here the interest rate.
The K explanatory variables are zt = (1;￿t+h;yt+l;it￿1)
0 and the time-varying
coe¢ cients are ￿t = (a0;t;a￿;t;ay;t;ai;t)
0. Ki instrumental variables Zt 2 It￿1
are used to deal with the endogeneity source in (2). If the coe¢ cients were set
equal to some ￿, the dynamic GMM would apply:
E (xt ￿ z0
t￿jIt￿1) = 0 ) E ((xt ￿ z0
t￿)Zt) = 0
Properties of static GMM are valid and especially the optimality conditions.
The 2SLS are used and are equivalent to the GMM when the error term is ho-
moskedastic. To deal with the potential heteroskedasticity of the disturbance
term, the Three Stages Least Squares (3SLS) are applied. The GMM frame-
work allows to estimate a small number of coe¢ cients, here four, with many























7This minimization problem is equivalent to the 2SLS or the 3SLS for an
appropriate S. Kim and Nelson (2006) modify the two-step approach. On the
contrary, I propose to adapt the minimization problem (3).
In my setup, one can still write moment conditions:
E (xt ￿ z0
t￿tjIt￿1) = 0 ) E ((xt ￿ z0
t￿t)Zt) = 0
Since there are less moment conditions than the number of unknown coe¢ -
cients, the amount of time variation of the coe¢ cients has to be limited, which






















where Qemp is the empirical covariance matrix of ￿￿t. Program (4) may appear














where m > 0. This paper adopts a non-parametric estimation strategy, smooth-
ing splines to be precise. The quadratic penalization of the ￿rst di⁄erence of ￿t
is quite standard in the litterature, see Craven and Wahba (1978) for instance.
The higher the m, the smoother the f. I focus on m = 1, the ￿rst di⁄erence
in the discrete case is equivalent to the ￿rst derivative in the continuous case.
Therefore, I choose the m which constrains the less the transition to be smooth.
Nevertheless, this penalization of the variation in the coe¢ cients tends to avoid
one-time breaks.
The choice of S has to be grounded as well as the amount of variability in
the coe¢ cients, that is Qemp, where Qemp is diagonal here.
2.2 Economic interpretation
In the standard neo-keynesian framework, three equations describe the economy:
the New Keynesian Philipps Curve (NKPC), the IS curve and the monetary




￿t = 4￿yt + ￿Et (￿t+1) + "
p
t
yt = Et (yt+1) ￿ ￿ [it ￿ Et (￿t+1)] + "
g
t
it = a￿Et￿1 (￿t+h) + ayEt￿1 (yt+l) + aiit￿1 + "i
t
(5)






t respectively stand for a mark-up shock, a demand shock and a
monetary policy shock and where ￿t, yt and it are taken as deviation to their
steady state values. In the present paper, I will only estimate the last equation
of (5).
In the application, both the reduced form (1) and a more structural form
will be commented:
it = (1 ￿ ￿t)i￿
t + ￿tit￿1 + !t
i￿
t = ￿0;t + ￿￿;tEt￿1 (￿t+h) + ￿y;tEt￿1 (yt+l)
= rt + ￿￿
t + ￿￿;t (Et￿1 (￿t+h) ￿ ￿￿
t) + ￿y;tEt￿1 (yt+l)
(6)




(1 ￿ ￿t)￿0;t;(1 ￿ ￿t)￿￿;t;(1 ￿ ￿t)￿y;t;￿t
￿0
i￿
t is the target interest rate which is reached gradually by the FED. ￿￿;t
is the elasticity of the target to expected in￿ ation or the long-term response
of the interest rate to in￿ ation. The coe¢ cient ￿0;t has no simple structural
interpretation. It is linked to the equilibrium real rate rt and to the in￿ ation
objective ￿￿






Once (￿t)t2[1;T] is known, one can see whether and when the equilibrium is
locally determined. But the answer depends on the other structural equations in
(5). The estimation of such equations in a time-varying framework goes further
than the present study so the coe¢ cients ￿;￿ and ￿ will be held constant6.
3 Estimation of a time-varying parameter model
in a Generalized Method of Moments frame-
work





























with R being the Lagrange multiplier, a de￿nite positive matrix. (4) is a special
case with R being diagonal.
6We neglect structural variations in the real economy. Sims and Zha (2006) consider VAR
models with switching regimes where they allow for changes both in the variance of the shocks
and in the coe¢ cients. The model with changes in the volatility only gives the best ￿t to the
data, but among time-varying coe¢ cients models, the best ￿t is the model which allows only
the monetary policy rule to change.
9Notice that (7) is a numerical procedure which can be solved independently
of any statistical model. It is a non-parametric problem which belongs to the






E (Ztvt) = 0





A whole class of estimates can be obtained, one for each possible choice of
R and S. (8) will be useful to study the statistical properties of the proposed
estimates.
Hodrick and Prescott￿ s approach belongs to this kind of methods. The HP
￿lter extracts a trend b yt (￿) from the data xt:












3.1 Solution to the minimization problem
In this section (￿t)t2[0;T] stand for the estimated coe¢ cients solution of (7) and
























8t 2 [1;T ￿ 1];ztZ0
tS￿ + T2R(￿t+1 ￿ 2￿t + ￿t￿1) = 0
￿zTZ0
TS￿ + T2R(￿T ￿ ￿T￿1) = 0
T2R(￿1 ￿ ￿0) = 0
10After some calculation7, let us look for ￿ and (￿t)t2[0;T] such that:
8
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I rewrite the latest equation:
J (R;S)￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿0￿0



















From (11), ￿0 is su¢ cient to know ￿. ￿0 is given using the last equation of
(10):




(12) reminds us of the GMM formula with weighting matrix SJ￿1 which is
de￿nite positive as can be seen from (11).
7T2R(￿T ￿ ￿T￿1) = T2R
T￿1 P
t=1
















S￿ = 0 ) ￿S￿ = 0
Lets compute 8t 2 [1;T] a formula of ￿￿t function of ￿ :
T2R(￿t ￿ ￿t￿1) = T2R
t￿1 P
i=1
[(￿i+1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ (￿i ￿ ￿i￿1)] + T2R(￿1 ￿ ￿0)














8t 2 [1;T], there is a formula of ￿t function of ￿ :


























113.2 Closed form formula
From now on,
^
￿t refers to the estimated value of the coe¢ cients whereas ￿t refers


















































Since Mt￿0 = IK, the di⁄erence between the estimate and the true value is:
^














































































































3.3 Choice of (R;S)
Given (R;S), one can solve (7), thus obtaining a whole class of estimates. In
order to choose the best one, I rely on a e¢ ciency criterion, trying to minimize
8This formula accounts for the heteroskedasticity of ￿t. If the forward-looking horizon h
or l exceeds the current quarter, there might be a source of autocorrelation of ￿t which is not
taken into account. Both Kim and Nelson (2006) and Boivin (2006) choose situations such
that they can ignore autocorrelation.
12the mean squared error of the estimate. One can proove that this estimate is
the best possible in terms of the global distance between the curve of the true
coe¢ cients and the curve of the estimates. Since (14) depends on Qu, the ￿rst
step is to know Qu, the covariance matrix of the innovation of ￿t. To achieve
this, I use the Median Unbiased Estimate developped in Stock and Watson
(1998)9.
3.3.1 Modi￿cation of Stock and Watson (1998) to deal with endo-
geneity
This section adapts Stock et Watson￿ s median unbiased estimate to allow for
endogeneity as described in Sowell (1996). Following Stock and Watson (1998),
assume that there is ￿ such as, for every T, the covariance matrix Qu can be




where Q is ￿xed to some particular value. The restricted form (15) can be
seen in terms of frequency of the observations: for a given time period, if the
number of observations is two times larger, the variance between two consecutive
coe¢ cients is two times smaller.
The state vector ￿t is a discretization of a time continuous process10:





















9Here, a maximum likehood (ML) approach can not be used without additionnal informa-
tion on the distribution of the shocks. Moreover Stock and Watson (1998) show that when
one estimates Qu with ML, there is pile-up problem in the algorithm, which means that it












￿k and from the




￿k ) B2 (s)


























































where B1 : R ! RK
i
is another standard brownian motion. As can be seen,
when there is no endogeneity problem, the same results as Stock and Watson￿ s
￿rst theorem can be obtained because ￿ / M. In the more general case, the









. It means that the variance of the innovations
ui;t is proportionnal to the asymptotic covariance of the GMM estimate and
that there is no cross correlation in ut
12. This formula is quite natural but
appendix A.4 prooves the robustness toward this arbitrary choice, mainly in two
directions: the diagonal form of Q and the mesurement error on Q￿ s diagonal
terms. This formula is neutral with respect to any multiplicative transformation
of the regressors or the instruments and it is the equivalent of the quantity
proposed in Stock and Watson (1998). Moreover, the less precise the GMM
estimate is for a given coe¢ cient, the more one can think it is due to some time











W (s;￿;D) = B1 (s) ￿ sD(D0D)
￿1 D0B1 (1) + ￿D
￿ s R
0






11For any de￿nite positive matrix A, A
1






12corr (ui;t;uj;t) = 0 for any i 6= j. This is a disputable choice. Since ut is the innovation
in a reduced form, there must be some cross-correlation. As there is no clue on its form, I
prefer to remain neutral.













































To implement the estimate of ￿, one only need to compute LT and, for each




0 W (s;￿;D)ds taking D
equal to its estimated value. The estimate of ￿ is then:
^
￿ = m￿1 (LT)
Stock and Watson￿ s method is implemented with:
b S
￿1
















b Q = Diag
￿
c M0b ￿￿1c M
￿￿1
b D = b ￿￿ 1
2 c M b Q
1
2





I have now a whole set of estimates, one for each choice of (R;S). One can prefer
one estimate to another and there are many possible choices. The more natural
choice is the estimate that is the closest to the true value of the coe¢ cients, after
giving a de￿nition of what close means. My stand is to choose the estimate which
has the smallest mean squared error. Moreover, I will show that it is the one


































￿SJ￿1. Following (11), de￿ne:


























15Proposition 1 The optimal (R;S) is the choice that minimizes \ MSE0. The
solution is:
R￿ = 1
b ￿2 b Q
￿1
S￿ = b ￿￿1
(19)
Proof. The demonstration follows the one in the GMM case:























If S = b ￿￿1 and R = 1












































b V ￿ 1
2￿0
￿0






For a given S and R:
\ MSE0 = 1
T (￿N￿0)
￿1 ￿N b V N￿0 (￿N￿0)
￿1
\ MSE0 = 1
T (￿N￿0)











Now, BC = (￿N￿0)
￿1 ￿N b V
1
2 b V ￿ 1
2￿0 = IK so that:
\ MSE0 ￿ \ MSE
￿
0 = 1














Proposition 2 (R￿;S￿) minimizes the mean squared error \ MSEt for each sin-
gle t. The optimal estimate is thus e¢ cient for each t.
Proof. Consider ￿t as a starting point instead of ￿0 in the solution of the
minimization program. All details are given in appendix A.3
Proposition 3 De￿ne the loss Li on coe¢ cient i 2 [1;K] and its expectation







￿i;t ￿b ￿i;t (R;S)
￿2







￿i;t ￿b ￿i;t (R;S)
￿2
!
then (R￿;S￿) minimizes the risk Ri on coe¢ cient i.
13C (C0C)
￿1 C0 is the orthogonal projector on the space generated by the columns of
matrix C. Now a vector X has always a greater norm than its projection so X0X >
X0C (C0C)
￿1 C0C (C0C)
￿1 C0X so IKi ￿ C (C0C)
￿1 C0 is de￿nite positive.
16Proof. \ MSEt.is minimum for the choice (R￿;S￿).
As a consequence, E
￿￿
￿i;t ￿b ￿i;t (R￿;S￿)
￿2￿
is minimum, being a diagonal







￿i;t ￿b ￿i;t (R;S)
￿2￿
In line with the spline litterature, the estimate minimizes the risk and, in
addition, it is e¢ cient for a given t.
The optimal values (19) are the equivalent of the sound to noise ratio used in
Hodrick and Prescott (1981). There is an analogy between the choice of (R;S)
and the choice of the parameter ￿ of the HP ￿lter (9). In their seminal work,
Hodrick and Prescott justify the choice of ￿ by the writing of the joint likehood
of the signal and the trend. It is possible to show that the sound to noise ratio
has many interesting properties. For instance, Schlicht (2006) prooves that it
is the unique ￿ such that b yt (￿) = E (yjx). One could proove that it minimizes
the mean squared error between the estimated trend and the real one.
The weighting matrix S￿ is the same as the one used in the standard GMM
when heteroskedasticity matters. Finally, Q is diagonal, so is R￿ and therefore
cross terms are not penalized in (7).
3.4 Comments
First, the problem is equivalent to a minimization program (7) which reminds us
of a ￿lter approach such as Hodrick and Prescott (1981). The method belongs
to non-parametric statistics and more precisely smoothing splines.
In contrast to Kim and Nelson (2006), the method does not require specifying
initial conditions ￿0. If ￿t were stationnary, then one could set initial conditions
to the long term value of the coe¢ cients. Here, ￿t is integrated and a Kalman
￿lter approach requires initial conditions often estimated on a time invariant
form of (1) on the beginning of the sample. The initial conditions are not
accurate and that error source in the procedure is decreasing but persistent
as time goes by. Furthermore, the 40 ￿rst observations at least should not be
accounted for in the main estimation.
My method is derived from the GMM litterature and is based on moment
conditions rather than sum of squares. As in the GMM case the estimate is
heteroskedasticity robust. As a constrast, in a Kalman ￿ltering approach, a
special form of heteroskedasticity for the residuals has to be imposed. The
random walk assumption for ￿t allows for permanent changes. A more general
autoregressive form would have led to a mean reverting process.
This method has some drawbacks. First of all, it does account for the het-
eroskedasticity of vt but not for its possible autocorrelation when the forecast
17horizon is greater than one period. If autocorrelation is signi￿cant, the estimate
is not optimal any more. Stock and Watson (1998) propose to apply an autore-
gressive ￿lter to the model (8) so that the error term vt is not autocorrelated.
Then, a part of arbitrary choice remains in the de￿nition of Q. Other choices
shown in appendix A.4. assess the robustness to this issue: for example, if the
relative variances were wrong, the estimated coe¢ cients would adjust around
the true coe¢ cients. Then, because of the quadratic penalization of the changes
in the coe¢ cients, a smooth transition is favoured rather than one-time breaks.
It is possible to penalize the absolute value of the ￿rst di⁄erence of the coe¢ -
cients but this solution is analytically intractable. Another issue deals with the
deep nature of ￿t and thus the properties of ut. To implement Stock and Wat-
son￿ s method, it is implicitly assumed that ut is independent of the other shocks
in the economy. This is not likely and there must have been some interactions
between the real economy and the way monetary policy was conducted. It is a
substantial limitation of the time-varying approach. In the spline framework,
this issue matters only for the optimality conditions because this is the only
part where distibution hypotheses are made.
4 What does it tell us about the FED monetary
policy ?
The method can be implemented to various speci￿cations depending on h and
l:
it = a0;t + a￿;tEt￿1 (￿t+h) + ay;tEt￿1 (yt+l) + ai;tit￿1 + !t
which is more easily understandable as (6):
it = (1 ￿ ￿t)
￿
￿0;t + ￿￿;tEt￿1 (￿t+h) + ￿y;tEt￿1 (yt+l)
￿
+ ￿tit￿1 + !t
I consider two baseline formulations: h = l = 0 which corresponds to the
situation in which the FED reacts to current values, not available at the time
it takes a decision and the case h = 3 et l = 0 when the central bank reacts to
expected in￿ ation a year ahead ￿t+3 = 1
4 (￿t + ￿t+1 + ￿t+2 + ￿t+3) as well as
to the current output gap. Kim and Nelson (2006) corresponds to h = l = 0
given the notations, Boivin (2005) to the second case.
4.1 Data
I use data from the FRED database (Federal Reserve Economic Data) available
on the FED of St Louis website.
The rule I consider depends only on in￿ ation and real activity. It would have
been possible to extend the set of explanatory variables to money or commodity
price. However, there is no evidence that the central bank looked at such vari-
ables. Then, they could enter the instruments Zt meaning that the FED care
about, say commodity price, as part of future in￿ ation.
18I use the quaterly di⁄erence of the GDP de￿ ator (GDPDEF) annualized as
a mesure of in￿ ation.
For the output gap, I follow Kim and Nelson (2006) and take the de￿-
nition of the Congressional Budget O¢ ce, which is a semi-structural estimate
(GDPC96-GDPPOT) very close to the extraction of a quadratic trend as shown
in appendix A.4.3.
it is set equal to the average Federal Fund Rate in the ￿rst month of each
quarter (FEDFUNDS).
The set of instruments includes four lags of quarterly in￿ ation, output gap,
interest rate, quarterly change of M2 (M2SL), commodity price in￿ ation and
the spread between one year and ten years treasury bunds (GS1 and GS10).
These variables should bring information on future in￿ ation and the output
gap. Four lags are widespread in the litterature. For the commodity price, I
take the producer price index covering all the commodities (PPIACO in FRED
database, or WPU00000000 in the Bureau of Labor Statistics database).
Other de￿nitions are chosen in appendix A.4.3. to check for robustness.
4.2 Break estimates
As a ￿rst analysis, one can estimate a constant rule (1) on subperiods. I im-
plement a GMM technique, following Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). Here
the 2SLS allow to estimate the optimal weighting matrix in order to minimize
the asymptotic covariance of the GMM estimate. Then, we compute the 3SLS,
heteroskedasticity robust.
I consider the pre-Volcker era 1960Q1￿1979Q2 and the Volcker-Greenspan
era 1979Q3￿2006Q1. A third period 1987Q3￿2006Q1 is added for more stable
results, following Jondeau, Le Bihan and GallŁs (2004). The following tables
display the structural form (6) in order to ease the interpretation.
Table 1: GMM on 3 subperiods, h=l=0





























19The results are close to Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) even if the time
periods or the variables are slightly di⁄erent.
Table 2: Baseline Estimates
of Clarida, Gali & Gertler (2000)



















Notes: Table II from Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000)
The second speci￿cation gives:
Table 3: GMM on 3 subperiods:
Annual in￿ ation, contemporaneous output gap





























One can notice that the rule changed between the two subperiods. Until
1979, monetary policy seemed to accommodate in￿ ation whereas the long term
response of the interest rate to in￿ ation is above one under the chaimanship of
P.Volcker and A.Greenspan. The rule seems to be more and more countercycli-
cal.
This method su⁄ers from two main drawbacks. First, I assume one single
structural break. Second, identi￿cation is weak as GMM estimation is carried
out on a small time period.
204.3 Main results
4.3.1 Median unbiased estimate
Following Stock and Watson￿ s approach modi￿ed to allow for endogeneity, I can
compute the medians of the limiting distributions of LT
14:












For h = l = 0, LT = 19:1 which leads to
^
￿ = 7:1. For the second speci￿ca-




In the ￿rst speci￿cation, the FED reacts to expected current in￿ ation and output
gap. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the coe¢ cients of the rule (1). Figure 2
focuses on the second speci￿cation with medium term concerns. Because of
the delay needed for monetary policy to be e⁄ective, it is often assumed that
decisions are motivated with a medium term perspective. In contrast with Kim
and Nelson (2006), the long term response of the interest rate to in￿ ation starts
from a value below one, 0.8, in the 60s and reaches a value above one, between
1.4 and 1.8, in the 80s. The transition is quite brutal and occurs when P. Volcker
became chaiman of the Board. The degree of interest rate smoothing raises from
0.7/0.75 to 0.8/0.85. The response to the output gap raises from 0.6 to 1.1.




and (a0;a￿;ay;ai) are plotted because
the ￿rst set of coe¢ cients describes the long term response of the FED whereas
the second one describes the short term dynamics.
The monetary policy shock is not strictly equal to the residual which depends
also on forecast errors. Nevertheless, one can distinguish the oil shocks and the
appointment of P.Volcker. During these periods, discretion increased.
















￿ very much : in the second baseline
^
￿ = 6:8 instead of 6:4.


























































































Figure 1: h = l = 0
Notes: Optimal matrix S￿ and R￿; con￿dence interval ￿
p
MSE





































































































Figure 2: Expected annual in￿ ation, contemporaneous output gap




To allow for comparison, Figure 3 superposes my results to those by Kim and




















Notes: h = l = 0 in dark; Kim and Nelson (2006) in red
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) in blue
First, the central bank accommodated in￿ ation during the 60s and the 70s,
consistently with Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). It is true that the degree of
uncertainty around the point estimate of ￿￿ involves that ￿￿ is never statisti-
cally di⁄erent from one should not expect a high precision from a time-varying
approach. It can not be ruled out that the poor economic performance in the
70s was due to a weak reaction of the central bank (ie bad policy rather than
bad luck). The curve t ! ￿￿;t is closer to a stepwise function rather than a con-
tinuous one. One could conclude it fully justi￿es the structural break approach.
The long term response of the interest rate to the output gap continuously
increased from a value close to 0.6 in 1960 to 1.1 in 2000. The con￿dence in-
terval seems to move away from 0 as time increases. These results are di⁄erent
from Kim and Nelson (2006). The central bank became more and more coun-
tercyclical while implementing its disin￿ ation policy. This increasing pro￿le of
￿y is robust as shown in appendix A.4 but contradicts some previous studies
by Orphanides (2004) or Boivin (2006). Their results rather favor a decrease in
this response. The main explanation of this huge di⁄erence relies on the type
of data used, real time or ex-post.
24The degree of interest rate smoothing ￿ is increasing. Kim and Nelson￿ s
results are particular on this issue. They ￿nd ￿ to be close to 0.5 during the
￿rst oil shock, which may be due to an imperfect heteroskedasticity speci￿cation
in their model.
Romer and Romer (2002) describe the changes in the conduct of monetary
policy in the postwar United States. They ￿nd that the FED focused more on
real activity than on in￿ ation in the 60s and 70s. However, as soon as P.Volcker
was appointed chairman of the Board, the FED vigourously struggled against
in￿ ationnary pressures without giving up growth concerns:
In the 1950s, policy-makers cautiously balanced concerns over in￿ ation
and real activity; in the 1960s, they focused vigorously on increasing real
activity; in the 1970s, they pursued policies ranging from rapid expansion
to full-￿ edged contraction to grudging tolerance of in￿ ation; in the early
1980s, they followed a policy of aggressive disin￿ ation; and since that
time, they have again cautiously balanced the pursuit of real growth with
concern about the possibility of in￿ ation. (Romer and Romer, 2002, p
70-71)
To go further in the bad luck v. bad policy debate, it is necessary to know
whether and when monetary policy was able to insure the local determinacy of
the equilibrium. As Woodford (2003) shows, the answer is often depending on
a weighted sum of ￿￿ and ￿y.
Proposition 4 The economy is described by (5), in the case h = l = 0. The




￿y;t ￿ 1 > 0




ay;t + ai;t ￿ 1 > 0 (20)
Proof. See appendix A.5.
Let us calibrate ￿ = 0:99 and ￿ = 0:024 according to table 5.1 in Woodford
(2003). It is not only possible to check if (20) is true or not but also the
uncertainty surrounding this criterion and the probability that (20) is satis￿ed.
25b a￿;t +
1￿￿
















Figure 4: Local determinacy of the equilibrium
Notes: h = l =0
One has to be careful with ￿gure 4. A simple DSGE model has been chosen
and ￿ or ￿ may have changed during the time period. One may argue (5) has
micro-foundations so the IS curve or the NKPC did not change but it is only a
simpli￿ed form15. Moreover, we derived the criterion in a static way, as if the
economic agents did not know the rule was changing. This is not a too strong
hypothesis since the coe¢ cients follow a random walk and therefore today values
are the best estimates of tomorrow ones. Conditionnal on these hypotheses, it
is not likely that the equilibrium was locally determined in the 60ies or in the
70ies.
5 Conclusion
This article deals with the estimation of a forward looking monetary rule with
time-varying parameters. This framework faces two econometric issues, endo-
geneity of the regressors and changing coe¢ cients.
This article is new mainly because of its econometric strategy. I try to an-
swer a key question, here the way monetary policy evolved in the United States,
by imposing as few hypotheses as possible. More precisely, I combine the GMM
framework to the smoothing splines litterature. Using a non-parametric ap-
proach is quite appropriate here. The framework implemented does not impose
any restrictions on the form of the heteroskedasticity or the way regressors are








which depends on ￿, the probability of no price reoptimization,
on ￿, the intertemporal elasticity of substition and on ￿, the elasticity of labour supply.
Ball (2006) favors a decrease of ￿ on the period that he links to three main reasons : the
globalization which exerts a downward pressure on national prices; the central bank credibility
which anchors expectations ; a moderate in￿ation which allows ￿rms to change their price less
often and thus increases ￿.
26correlated to the disturbance term. Progresses are made in three main direc-
tions: initial conditions are estimated with all the information; the estimation
is carried out in one single step; robustness is checked.
Moreover, the results can be compared to the existing litterature. As many
other authors, I ￿nd an increasing long term response of the interest rate to
expected in￿ ation, especially strong during the chairmanship of P.Volcker and
A.Greenspan. Concerning the output gap, I ￿nd evidence that the central bank
became more and more countercyclical, which is a new result. My categorisation
is consistent with the time division in Romer and Romer (2002), especially the
accommodative pattern before 1980 and the stability of the period 1980-2006.
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A.1 Data


































Interest rate Change of M2 Commodities
Figure 5: Data
Then I carry out stationnarity tests with a sequential approach.
For the interest rate, an augmented Dickey-Fuller test is implemented with a
constant in the regressors and a number of lags according to the AIC criterion.
Student statistic ￿ is equal to ￿3:19 and the critical values at 1%, 5%, 10% are
respectively ￿3:47 , ￿2:88 et ￿2:57. This test rejects the null hypothesis of a
unit root at a 5% level (p-value equal to 2.2%). A KPSS stationnarity test gives
a value of 0:33 whereas critical values at 1%, 5% and 10% are 0:74, 0:46 et 0:35.
We do not reject the null hypothesis of stationnarity.
For the in￿ ation, an ADF test with a constant is chosen. ￿ = ￿2:10 and
hence it does not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at a 5% level (p-
value equal to 24%). A KPSS stationnarity test gives a value of 0;40. The null
hypothesis of stationnarity can not be rejected.
A.2 Kim and Nelson￿ s appoach
30Kim and Nelson (2006) propose a two-step procedure for the estimation
of (2), time-varying equivalent of the 2SLS. They instrument (2) with lags of
in￿ ation, output gap, interest rate, quarterly change of M2 or the in￿ ation of
commodities.
First, they compute the forecast errors. They estimate the following state-














t is assumed to follow a GARCH(1;1) in order to take into account
the heteroskedasticity of the forecast error. The Kalman ￿lter is hence slightly
modi￿ed following Harvey, Ruiz & Sentana (1992). They compute the forecast
errors v￿
tjt￿1 = ￿t+h ￿ Z0
t￿
￿












To implement the second step, they model the correlation between vt and































￿t = ￿t￿1 + ut
￿2




Writing the estimator formula in a di⁄erent way shows that minimizing
MSE0 is equivalent to minimizing each MSEt0. To get this result, the stress
is put on ￿t0 instead of ￿0 in the resolution of (7).
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J (t0)￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿0￿t0








The mean squared error is:

















































which is minimized for
￿
R￿ = 1
b ￿2 b Q
￿1
;S￿ = b ￿￿1
￿
. From here, the proof follows
the one detailed for t0 = 0.
A.4 Robustness analysis
A.4.1 Choice of Q
I focus on the second baseline with in￿ ation one year ahead and contempora-
neous output gap. I have to impose an arbitrary value for Q following Stock and
Watson (1998). When the dimension of the hidden variable is greater than one,
it is equivalent to ￿x the relative variances of the innovations of the coe¢ cients
It is possible to test for robustness with respect to this choice. More precisely,
I change one diagonal element of Q from a ten factor, which is huge. Figure 6




























Figure 6 (1): Robustness with respect to Q
Notes: in blue Q
0







































Figure 6 (2): Robustness with respect to Q
Notes: in blue Q diagonal; in red Q non restricted
A.4.2 Uncertainty surrounding ￿
Stock & Watson￿ s method makes it possible to build a con￿dence inter-










= P (q￿ (￿) < LT) = 1 ￿ ￿












I take ￿ = 0;16, which is one standard error in the gaussian case, and I
compute the curves obtained for ￿ and ￿. This modi￿cation allows to see how
the results would have been modi￿ed if a mistake was made on ￿. Figure 7

























Figure 7: Robustness with respect to ￿
Notes: in blue ￿, in green ￿ and in red ￿
A.4.3 Variables de￿nition
In this section, I investigate the robustness to various changes in the data
set.
Kim & Nelson (2006) do not include the spread between the short term and
the log term bonds, as opposed to Clarida, Gali & Gertler (2000). I chose to






















Figure 8: No spread in the instruments
Notes: in￿ ation one year ahead, contemporaneous output gap
One can choose the trend of the GDP to be quadratic.The time serie is close
to the CBO de￿nition.































Figure 9: Quadratic trend for GDP
Notes: in the upper part, CBO￿ s de￿nition in full line
quadratic trend in dashes ; in￿ ation one year ahead,
contemporaneous output gap
A.5 Determinacy of the equilibrium




￿t = 4￿yt + ￿Et (￿t+1)
yt = Et (yt+1) ￿ ￿ [it ￿ Et (￿t+1)]
it = a￿Et￿1 (￿t) + ayEt￿1 (yt) + aiit￿1
37To check whether the equilibrium is locally determined, I follow Woodford
(2003), ie check Blanchard & Kahn (1980) conditions. The model is slightly
di⁄erent from those detailed in Woodford (2003), that is why the whole proof
is given. De￿ne Pt = (￿t;yt)

















































































































































I only consider parameters sets such that ay > 0. The equilibrium is uniquely
and locally determined if and only if A has one root inside the unit circle and
two outside. I compute the characteristic polynomial of matrix A:
￿PA (X) = X3 + A2X2 + A1X + A0
with A2 = ￿1￿ 1
￿￿ai￿ 4￿￿






and A0 = ￿ai
￿ < 0. I look for values of the parameters such that one of the
three cases of proposition C.2 in Woodford (2003) is veri￿ed:
I 1 + A2 + A1 + A0 < 0 and ￿1 + A2 ￿ A1 + A0 > 0
II 1+A2+A1+A0 > 0 and ￿1+A2￿A1+A < 0 and A2
0￿A0A2+A1￿1 > 0
III 1+A2+A1+A0 > 0 and ￿1+A2￿A1+A < 0 and A2
0￿A0A2+A1￿1 < 0
and jA2j > 3
Given the signs of A0;A1 and A2, ￿1+A2￿A1+A0 < 0, case I is excluded.
Then, for case II or III to be veri￿ed, I must have:
381 + A2 + A1 + A0 > 0 , a￿ +
1 ￿ ￿
4￿
ay + ai ￿ 1 > 0 (21)




￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)ai+￿
￿ (1 ￿ ai)ay+4￿￿
￿ a￿+ 1
￿2 (￿ ￿ ai)(1 ￿ ai)(1 ￿ ￿)
If (21) is true:
A2
0￿A0A2+A1￿1 > ￿4￿￿
￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)ai+￿
￿ (1 ￿ ai)ay+ 1









0 ￿ A0A2 + A1 ￿ 1 > ￿4￿￿
￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)ai + 4￿￿
￿2 ￿ (1 ￿ ai) + ￿
￿ (1 ￿ ai)ay ￿
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)ay + 1
￿2 (￿ ￿ ai)(1 ￿ ai)(1 ￿ ￿)
A2
0￿A0A2+A1￿1 > 4￿￿
￿2 (￿ ￿ ai)+￿
￿ (￿ ￿ ai)ay+ 1
￿2 (￿ ￿ ai)(1 ￿ ai)(1 ￿ ￿)
A2





￿2 (1 ￿ ai)(1 ￿ ￿)
i
If ￿ > ai, A2
0 ￿ A0A2 + A1 ￿ 1 > 0 and case II is veri￿ed.
If ai > ￿, 1
￿ +ai + 4￿￿
￿ +￿ay > 1
￿ +￿ > 2 because x ￿! x+ 1
x is decreasing
on [0;1]. Hence jA2j = 1+ 1
￿ +ai + 4￿￿
￿ +￿ay > 3, and therefore either case II,
or case III is veri￿ed.
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